

# **A PRESENTATION TO THE COMMISSIONER CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF THE COASTAL FERRY ACT ON THE COMMUNITY OF SALT SPRING ISLAND WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE.**

Thank you for the opportunity to make this presentation which is the product of members of the Salt Spring Island Ferry Advisory Committee. We have spent a good deal of time over the last years considering the rising cost of using the ferry system, why this should be so and its effect on our island community.

We note that your review of the Coastal Ferry Act (the Act) will encompass all aspects of the Act. Our presentation will touch on the Act as it relates to overall transportation policy of the Province and will consider the effects of the Coastal Ferry Services Contract (CFSC) on those minor routes that directly or indirectly impact our island community's ability to function in a manner consistent with that of other BC communities of about 10,000 population and which have a strong tourism sector.

## **BACKGROUND**

We are well aware of the serious financial and operating position the BC Ferry Corporation was in prior to the implementation of the Act. There is little doubt that it was bold and imaginative legislation that created a ferry operating entity that has considerable freedom to raise capital, set fare levels, acquire much needed new vessels and undertake the very considerable infrastructure improvements that had been neglected for some years. The key element of the Act that affects our community was the separation of the major and minor routes and the elimination of cross-subsidization.

Clearly, the major routes are the dominant revenue generators for the total enterprise, contributing approximately 86 % of the revenue in 2010. Improvements in both vessels and terminals on the major routes since the implementation of the Act has been remarkable. However, elimination of cross subsidization and its replacement with the CFSC has had a significant adverse impact on all communities not served by the major routes. We wish to draw the Commission's attention to those impacts that have directly and indirectly affected the ferry routes servicing Salt Spring Island.

## **SITUATION**

Both the Act and the CFSC were introduced at an early stage of a new Provincial Government. At that time there was a fairly well earned perception within the Government that ferry services were expensive and presented opportunities for considerable economies. This was particularly so in what was called the minor routes. It was determined that the service fee paid to the ferry operator should not be indexed to CPI. Indeed, the intention was to progressively reduce the fee until the minor routes "would become self supporting over time". This statement alone shows how far removed from the reality of operating the ferry service Government was. The new operating entity, BC Ferry Services Ltd (BCF) inherited an ageing fleet with little commonality in engines and equipment and a large number of terminals spread throughout the coast, some of which needed immediate replacement. BCF had a huge task ahead of it. We recognize the challenge that this presents to BCF. Indeed, we think it could be said that even if the minor routes were a "going concern" with modern equipment and well maintained terminals, the financial terms of the CFSC would still have been difficult to comply with because of unforeseen issues which had a major impact on the way BCF delivered the contracted services to island communities.

## ISSUES AND RECOMENDATIONS

The first of the unforeseen issues was the sharp rise in fuel prices. That a fuel surcharge was inevitable was understood. The Act clearly acknowledges the need for Government support for the minor routes. That the CFSC did not contain a provision that would appropriately allocate the rising price of fuel between Government and the ferry user resulted in the minor route ferry user assuming the entire burden of the rising price of fuel. The result was minor route surcharges which were on average double that of the major routes.

***RECOMENDATION. We believe that the CFSC must contain a clause dealing with fuel prices that binds the Government to a share of the surcharge or rebate, consistent with the level of subsidy provided to a minor route.***

The second unforeseen issue is BCF's interpretation of the CFSC. Prior to the inception of the Act Salt Spring Island had attempted to obtain a more equitable access to route 9 that connects all of the Southern Gulf Islands with Tsawwassen. It had been an endeavour with a long history. A review of page 19 of BCF's most recent report to the Commission shows that route 9 and its connecting route 5 & 5a have the worst on time performance of all the routes in the system. This is not the fault of BCF operations, rather it is the fault of unrealistic scheduling of both routes. In the eyes of BCF the CFSC commit them to these schedules and no changes could be made. We have been told repeatedly by BCF senior management, "we are a service provider, if you want any changes talk to the Government". Perhaps our understanding of the CFSC is misguided but it does not appear to us that the wording of the contract is so restrictive. Since the inception of the Act there has been excessive and unwarranted overtime; a needless use of fuel in the order of 2000 litres per day; and, a lack of reliability that lowers both ridership and revenue.

Clearly this was not the intention of the Act or the CFSC, but it is the result. Questions arise such as: Is BCF at fault for not seeking a more efficient operation? Is the Government at fault for not ensuring good stewardship of taxpayer funds? Section 38 of the Act as shown in a box on page 6 of the Commissions 2011 annual report makes clear that the "ferry operator be encouraged to adopt a commercial approach to ferry service delivery" also that the operator "be encouraged to minimize expense without adversely effecting safe compliance with core services". We feel that these statements speak to the need for prudent use of taxpayer money and also provide operational flexibility for the operator.

Referring to the CFSC and the amending agreement of the 31<sup>st</sup> March 2008, Section B makes clear that the Service Fee is calculated for each route in the contract. For each route BCF will provide a set number of round trips with specified vessels and terminal infrastructure. The short version of the CFSC does not define what is meant by a "round trip". Where more than two port calls are made in one "round trip" this is acknowledged but not defined. This is our basic and simplified understanding of this part of the CFSC.

***RECOMENDATION. We believe that the Commission's mandate must include the examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of the minor route services in the Gulf Islands. We have some confidence in making these statements as a very thorough review of data provided by BCF has shown that efficiency and effectiveness can be improved with out lowering core service levels or employing additional capital.***

## ECONOMIC IMPACTS

With the prospect of a 4.15% rise in the price cap for the first year of the Third Performance term we feel that our minor routes are entering a critical phase. We have compared the travel volumes and the fare box revenues for selected routes for the 2009/10 and 2010/11 periods.

Between 2010 and 2011 ridership on the Southern Gulf Islands routes (AEQ and passengers) declined by 3.2%. However, BCF revenue on the subject routes remained basically flat (-0.2%), (SEE APPENDIX 1). The conclusion most island residents arrived at is - that increased fares ( over 100% on some routes since 2003) have not served to increase BCF revenue but rather to drive down ferry ridership. As a result, island residents appear to be travelling less and tourists are clearly not coming to SSI in past numbers. Under the current BCF user-pay structure the community is confronted with a double-bind situation where high fares result in reduced ridership, which in turn results in reduced revenue for BCF, which is then obligated to increase fares in an effort to compensate for the declining revenue. This absurd cycle is destined to continue until something collapses and the residents of Salt Spring are very anxious that the collapse not be our island community. Below are a few specific areas of concern.

### **Tourism:**

Visitor Information Centre statistics for the past four years highlight our concern for the economic health of the community, (SEE APPENDIX 2).

August is typically the largest month for visitors to SSI. It should be noted that visitors in August 2011 were down 36% from August 2010. And visitors to the island in August 2010 were down 27% from August 2009. Overall, the 29,992 visitors to SSI in 2011 will be down 28.6% from our high of 42,039 visitors in 2009. As well, 2011 will be the first time in many years that visitors through our Visitor Information Centre failed to exceed 30,000.

### **Specific Business Case:**

Mouat's Trading Co. Ltd. has been in operation on SSI for 105 years. The company owns several commercial buildings in Ganges (landlord to over 30 tenants) and operates three retail stores in the village, (hardware, clothing and gifts). Business results from the three retail stores are as follows:

2004	baseline
2005	revenue increased by 3.9%
2006	revenue increased by 5.9%
2007	revenue increased by 0.4%
2008	revenue declined by 6.1%
2009	revenue declined by 3.3%
2010	revenue increased by 0.7%
2011	revenue will decline by 3.3% (* estimated to year end)

From a high in 2007 revenue has declined by 11.6% in 2011. It is significant to note that Mouat's 2011 retail revenue will be somewhat less than its 2004 revenue, (the company will likely resist the temptation to simply raise product prices in order to compensate for reduced revenue). This softening of revenue is not without significant ripple effects in the community. For example, lower revenue results in:

- less hiring and fewer wage increases for the company's 59 full and part-time employees
- less advertising by the company and the knock-on effect on the local newspapers, radio and community service publications
- reduced store inventories and the adverse impact on local and regional suppliers
- reduced repairs and maintenance and the associated effects on trades people who service Mouat's various buildings

It is highly probable that all businesses on SSI have experienced, or are experiencing, results similar to Mouat's. Unfortunately, the steady erosion of business over the last number of years has resulted in what can best be described as a malaise within the business community on SSI.

### **User-pay Model:**

A question that arises periodically on SSI is "why is government so keen on pursuing a user-pay model for BCF yet it continues to traditionally fund all other forms of public transportation within the province"? There is general agreement by islanders that consistency and equity in the development and implementation of public transportation policy should be a government requirement. We have no doubt that such a priority would be enthusiastically welcomed by all island and coastal communities.

A recent Islands Trust Position Paper (APPENDIX 4) highlighted the 2005-2006 percentage of cost recovery from users of the various transportation methodologies in BC as follows:

- BC Ferries	84%
- Ministry of Transportation	71%
- Translink	47%
- BC Transit	37%

In the event government is unwilling to increase its financial contribution to BCF in order to bring the ferry fees in line with the fees paid by users of the other transportation systems an alternate solution would be the implementation of a Ferry Equivalent Tariff (FET) to all other forms of public transportation. The FET would clearly save the government considerable money and would place all areas of the province on an equitable footing with respect to public transportation costs and government support.

## Summary:

Over the past number of years SSI has lost, or will soon be losing, a significant number of businesses, including:

- Vesuvius Pub
- Fulford Pub
- Shell Gas Station
- Patterson's Store and Gas Station
- Wind Flower Moon gift shop
- Admirals Sea Food
- Ganges Garment Co.
- Lady Minto Hospital Operating Room

The implication for government associated with the closure of these businesses is a loss of both corporate and personal income taxes. The implications for the community with the loss of the businesses and the closure of the hospital operating facility are more profound. As indicated earlier there exists a sense of malaise within the business community and an unhappy feeling that the Salt Spring Island economy is not healthy. While it is not possible to quantify the damage done to the community resulting from high ferry rates. It is clear that the rates are contributing to the overall decline in the economic health of the community. Current economic conditions including a high Canadian dollar, a decline in tourism from the USA, high fuel prices, and demographic changes are all serious issues for our local economy. However, having BCF rates (which are entirely within the control of government) aggravate an already serious economic condition seems to be entirely inappropriate.

***RECOMENDATION: Salt Spring Island is looking to have ferry rates that will enable BCF to be an engine of growth for the region – or at the very least – ferry rates that have a neutral impact on the financial health of the community. The user-pay pricing model that has been in place since 2003 is clearly not appropriate. It is time for the provincial government to adequately fund the ferry system in a manner that is consistent with its other public transportation systems.***

## FUTURE PROPOSALS

Against the backdrop of the foregoing we understand that BCF will post a loss in the order of \$30 million for the 2011 financial year. Add to this the need for the Province to return \$1.6 billion to the Federal Government following the HST referendum and it is clear to us that in-depth reviews of all Government expenditures will be required. Appropriate cost reductions to all ferry services supported by Government should be encouraged. The statement that “ minor routes around the Gulf Islands will not be affected “ must be treated with considerable scepticism.

We acknowledge that the inevitability of a serious review of the minor route services will add an additional burden to the Commission’s responsibilities. In this regard, the Ferry Advisory Committee of Salt Spring Island stands ready to be of service. In the interim we would draw the Commission’s attention to the following:

We are aware that BCF is reviewing the future of route 9. The current principle vessel, the Queen of Nanaimo has a very limited ability to extend its life. A replacement vessel is required, a daunting prospect in the current fiscal environment. However, a very necessary one if the current economic activity in the Southern Islands is to be maintained.

Route 9 is a crucial link between all the southern islands and the mainland. It has been the subject of a “tug of war” amongst the islands for many years. The attempt to please too many users too much of the time has created an unreliable service at an ever increasing cost. Potential visitors from the mainland have a variety of competing recreational options accordingly it is not surprising that both ridership and revenue is declining. It is inexplicable to us, for the reasons outlined earlier, that BCF has done nothing to counter this trend. We wish to make very clear to the Commissioner that the retention and effectiveness of route 9 has a direct bearing on the financial health of all the Southern Islands.

There is considerable variation in the efficiency and effectiveness of the routes in the Southern Islands area. A table illustrating this variation was developed from data contained in the BCF Report to the Commissioner for the year ending 31st March 2011, (SEE APPENDIX 3). In particular we would draw the Commissioner’s attention to “the percent of fare-box revenue to cost” and “the percent of Automobile Equivalent (AEQ) utilized” to that provided under the CFSC contract.

We are concerned that BCF might consider closing Long Harbour, the Salt Spring Island terminal for route 9. This terminal handles over 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of all route 9 traffic which, on weekends during the summer, represents about 400 AEQ and 2,000 passengers daily. If Long Harbour is closed where would this traffic be expected to go? Route 4, Fulford to Swartz Bay with transfer to route 1 is the only logical option. However, Fulford is already seriously overloaded with dangerous congestion in the village at “ferry time”. BCF is working with the Ministry of Transportation and our local government agencies to improve the steep narrow approach to the terminal. However, BCF currently has no plans to extend the terminal parking lot which accommodates less than 1/2 of the Skeena Queen’s AEQ capacity. The steep and narrow Fulford Ganges Road leading to the terminal acts as a linear parking lot for the remainder of the vessel’s AEQ capacity. In the summer months Fulford Harbour and the Skeena Queen handle between 900 and 1,000 AEQ daily. In the winter months the AEQ number drops to about 750 per day. Closing Long Harbour and shifting the ferry traffic to Fulford Harbour would result in unimaginable chaos in both the village and the terminal at Fulford. Indeed, handling the former Long Harbour traffic at Swartz Bay would generate additional

problems at that terminal including the need for a very expensive on-site vehicle transfer arrangement. The consistent level of commuter traffic on route 4 plus the inadequate terminal facilities at Fulford and Swartz Bay makes the closure of Long Harbour, even as an off-season proposal, not only problematic but unlikely to be cost effective.

***RECOMENDATION. That the Commission, when considering efficiency measures within the Southern Islands, reject any consideration to eliminate route 9 or to close the Long Harbour terminal. However, consideration should be given to the cost reduction options of having Long Harbour remain as the terminal for route 9 and the two-berth terminal at Mayne Island becoming the “integrated hub” for the outer islands. This is a workable concept and a proposal, along this line, was given to BCF by the Salt Spring Ferry Advisory Committee. We would further ask that the perceived rigidity of the CFSC requirements by BCF is examined and if necessary amended to permit the much needed efficiency and effectiveness to be put in place.***

Overshadowing all of the comments and recommendations contained in this presentation is the status of the Union contract. We are aware that the current seven-year collective agreement provided stability in the early years of the Act. It also appears to have tied BCF's hands to many terms and conditions that inhibit cost effective service delivery. Whether the current collective agreement is flexible enough to accommodate changes to a more efficient and effective service we are unable to say. We are however, certain that the question needs to be addressed.

Respectfully submitted

The Salt Spring Island Ferry Advisory Committee

## APPENDIX 1

### TRAFFIC AND REVENUE DATA FROM BCF ROUTE STATEMENTS FOR 2010 & 2011

\$ DATA IN 000'S	ROUTE 4	ROUTE 5& 5A	ROUTE 6	ROUTE 9 9A	TOTALS	ROUTE 8
	FULFORD	S.GULF ISL.	VESUVIUS	LHB/TSA		BOWEN
AEQ CARRIED 2009/10	328382	278538	278310	169052	1054282	497889
AEQ CARRIED 2010/11	325316	268017	267161	160641	1021135	498544
loss or gain	-3066	-10521	-11149	-8411	-33147	655
percent	-0.9	-3.8	-4.0	-5.0	-3.1	0.1
PASS CARRIED 2009/10	643386	501629	525434	470280	2140729	1132295
PASS CARRIED 2010/11	638662	479264	508191	444425	2070542	1135324
loss or gain	-4724	-22365	-17243	-25855	-70187	3029
percent	-0.7	-4.5	-3.3	-5.5	-3.3	0.3
AEQ REVENUE 2009/10	\$3,133	\$2,957	\$2,802	\$6,437	\$15,329	\$4,625
AEQ REVENUE 2010/11	\$3,125	\$3,017	\$2,825	\$6,258	\$15,225	\$4,832
loss or gain	-\$8	\$60	\$23	-\$179	-\$104	\$207
percent	-0.3	2.0	0.8	-2.8	-0.7	4.5
PASS REVENUE 2009/10	\$2,479	\$1,722	\$1,647	\$4,417	\$10,265	\$2,976
PASS REVENUE 2010/11	\$2,550	\$1,718	\$1,646	\$4,407	\$10,321	\$3,074
loss or gain	71	-4	-1	-10	56	98
percent	2.9	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	0.5	3.3

#### NOTES TO TABLE

Price caps for the above routes were increased 5.58% ( mitigated somewhat by a fuel surcharge rebate) yet the revenue gain was under 1%. We have added route 8 from Bowen Island, a mainly non discretionary commuter route where the revised price caps had the desired effect. This result was also evident to a lesser degree on route 4, another commuter route. The remaining routes, 5, 6 & 9 have significant discretionary travel. We are of the opinion that the proposed first year price caps of 4.15% with following years at 8.23% for performance term 3 will have very significant negative effects on all travel groups.

## APPENDIX 2

### VISITOR CENTER STATISTICS.

Total Visitors	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total
<b>2011</b>	<b>2,539</b>	<b>8,711</b>	<b>15,298*</b>	<b>3,414</b>	<b>29,992</b>
% change	-6.9%	-8.6%	-22.4%	7.8%	-14.7%
<b>2010</b>	<b>2,728</b>	<b>9,564</b>	<b>19,716</b>	<b>3,168</b>	<b>35,176</b>
% change	-12.5%	-14.6%	-18.1%	-13.4%	-16.3%
<b>2009</b>	<b>3,119</b>	<b>11,194</b>	<b>24,066</b>	<b>3,660</b>	<b>42,039</b>
% change	-20.3%	18.0%	3.3%	5.4%	4.6%
<b>2008</b>	<b>3,911</b>	<b>9,488</b>	<b>23,307</b>	<b>3,474</b>	<b>40,180</b>

\* Data was conservatively adjusted to estimate Sept 2011 and Q4 2011 numbers.



**APPENDIX 3**

NOTES TO TABLE

- 1) The loss or gain in assets is in fact a gain but is shown as a loss to show the impact on total cost.
- 2) The percentages for subsidy and fare box revenue do not add up to 100 unless the route is break even.
- 3) The profit or loss statement is impacted by annual maintenance costs which vary from year to year. An average over a number of years is necessary to get a true picture.
- 4) Route 8 which we consider as "efficient & effective" as a route can be shown for comparative purposes.
- 5) Fare box revenue includes social program fees and ancillary revenue.

**ABSTRACT OF DATA FROM ROUTE STATEMENTS FOR 12 MONTHS ENDING MARCH 2011**

<b>\$\$\$ DATA IN '000'S</b>	<b>ROUTE 4 FULFORD</b>	<b>ROUTE 5 &amp; 5A S.GULF ISL.</b>	<b>ROUTE 6 VESUVIUS</b>	<b>ROUTE 9 9A LHB/TSA</b>	<b>ROUTE 8 BOWEN</b>
FAREBOX REVENUE	\$6,503	\$5,885	\$5,113	\$12,792	\$9,104
SERVICE FEE	\$2,192	\$13,671	\$2,191	\$8,008	\$4,605
FEDERAL SUBSIDY	\$1,144	\$3,601	\$11	\$2,109	\$1,213
TOTAL SUBSIDY	\$3,336	\$17,272	\$2,202	\$10,117	\$5,818
TOTAL REVENUE	\$9,839	\$23,157	\$7,315	\$22,909	\$14,922
OPERATING EXPENSE	\$8,866	\$21,936	\$4,858	\$22,440	\$14,532
COST OF CAPITAL	\$3,022	\$3,170	\$821	\$4,178	\$3,103
LOSS OR GAIN ASSETS	<b>-\$109</b>	<b>-\$98</b>	<b>-\$82</b>	<b>-\$204</b>	<b>-\$145</b>
TOTAL COST	\$11,779	\$25,008	\$5,597	\$26,414	\$17,490
ROUTE PROFIT/LOSS 2010/2011	<b>-\$1,940</b>	<b>-\$1,851</b>	\$1,718	<b>-\$3,505</b>	<b>-\$2,568</b>
SUBSIDY AS % OF COST	28%	69%	39%	38%	33%
FARE BX. REV % OF COST	55%	24%	91%	48%	52%
RETURN FARE CAR & DRIVER	\$30.95	\$34.70	\$30.95	\$94.95	\$29.20
PASSANG	\$10.45	\$10.95	\$10.45	\$12.45	\$10.20
ROUND TRIPS	2924	3497	5039	824	5563
AEQ PROVIDED	575600	672186	703272	355970	941962
AEQ CARRIED	325316	268107	267161	160641	498544
% UTILIZATION AEQ	56.52	39.89	37.99	45.13	52.93
AEQ REVENUE	\$3,125	\$3,017	\$2,825	\$6,258	\$4,832
AS % FAREBOX REV.	48.05	51.27	55.25	48.92	53.08
TOTAL SUBSIDY PER AEQ CARR	\$10	\$64	\$8	\$63	\$12

## Appendix 2 \_Comparison of BC Transportation Infrastructure Financing

	BC Ferries		TransLink		BC Transit		Ministry of Transportation & Transportation Financing Authority	
	source for figures used: BCFS Annual Report 2005/2006, pg.62 March 31, 2006		source for figures used: TransLink Annual Report 2005, pg.32 December 31, 2005		source for figures used: 2006 BC Transit Annual Report, pg.43 March 31, 2006		source for figures used: Annual Service Plan Report 2005/06, pgs. 39, 40 March 31, 2006	
<b>Direct Revenues</b>	Tariffs Retail Other	353.6 68.7 23.6	Transit Fares Transit Advertising & Other Aircare	285.6 6.9 26.7	Passenger Fares & Advertising Other Revenue	47.4 2.5	Highway Tolls & Permits – MoT Other – MoT Motor Fuel Tax Act (6.75¢/liter) -TFA Social Services Tax (1.50¢/car rental day) - TFA Other (property revenue, etc) -TFA	63.2 57.7 417.9 12.0 55.7
	<b>Total Direct Revenues</b>	<b>445.9</b>	<b>Total Direct Revenues</b>	<b>319.2</b>	<b>Total Direct Revenues</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>Total Direct Revenues</b>	<b>606.5</b>
<b>Direct Operating Expenses</b>	Operations Maintenance Cost of Goods Administration Interest on Debt	291.8 81.1 27.0 51.2 25.1	Bus & Seabus Skytrain Commuter Rail Albion Ferry Aircare Services Major Road Network Maint. Transit Security & Police Other Projects Administration Interest on Debt	370.6 73.4 21.1 5.3 21.3 28.6 12.6 6.9 24.2 47.5	Operations & Maintenance Leases & Taxes Administration Interest on Debt	110.9 1.8 8.8 6.5	Ministry of Transportation Operations Highway Operations Transportation Improvements Administration MoT Total Transportation Financing Authority Operations Inland ferries Heartland Roads Program Other Planning & Administration TFA Interest on Debt TFA Total	444.6 20.3 12.3 (477.2) 8.0 13.0 45.2 8.5 155.4 (221.5)
	<b>Total Direct Expenses</b>	<b>(476.2)</b>	<b>Total Direct Expenses</b>	<b>(611.4)</b>	<b>Total Direct Expenses</b>	<b>(128.0)</b>	<b>Total Direct Expenses</b>	<b>(698.7)</b>
<b>Operating Net (Shortfall)</b>		<b>(30.3)</b>		<b>(292.3)</b>		<b>(78.1)</b>		<b>(92.2)</b>
<b>Direct Cost Recovery Ratio</b>		<b>93.6%</b>		<b>52.2%</b>		<b>39.0%</b>		<b>86.8%</b>
<b>Capital Expenses</b>	Amortization	(53.1)	Amortization	(66.4)	Amort. of Deferred Assets Amort. of Capital Assets Net Amortization	+4.3 (10.5) (6.2)	MoT Capital Expense TFA Net Amortization Net Capital Expenses	(15.4) (145.7) (161.1)
	<b>Total Expenses (direct + capital)</b>	<b>(529.3)</b>		<b>(677.7)</b>		<b>(134.2)</b>		<b>(859.7)</b>
<b>Full Cost Recovery Ratio</b>		<b>84.2%</b>		<b>47.1%</b>		<b>37.2%</b>		<b>70.5%</b>
<b>Subsidy Contributions</b>	Federal Contract Provincial Ferry Service Fees	24.9 108.2	Motor Fuel Tax (12¢/liter) Property Tax Levy Other fees & Levies City of Vancouver Contribution Federal Gov. Contribution Provincial Gov. Contribution	254.6 216.8 28.3 1.1 108.9 117.1	Local Taxation Provincial Gov. Contribution	32.9 52.1	No subsidy contribution figures were easily identifiable within either the 2005/06 Ministry of Transportation Annual Service Plan Report or the 2005/06 Transportation Financing Authority Financial Statements, and so are not included in this comparison chart.	
	<b>Total Subsidy Contributions</b>	<b>133.1</b>	<b>Total Subsidy Contributions</b>	<b>726.8</b>	<b>Total Subsidy Contributions</b>	<b>85.0</b>		

The above table compares the "user pay" cost recovery ratios of the coastal ferry system provided by BC Ferries with those of British Columbian public transit and public road service providers: TransLink (Greater Vancouver Transit Authority); BC Transit; and the Ministry of Transportation (which includes the Transportation Financing Authority). It also compares the level of "subsidy contributions" received by each agency from Provincial, Federal, and Local government taxpayer funded sources, as indicated within the financial statements of each agency for the reported year.